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Abstract 
The political question of how the will of a community is to be democratically formed and 
adhered to, the question of social democracy, is normatively tied to the mode of criminal 
justice employed within that democratic public sphere. Liberal, republican, procedural and 
communitarian forms of democratic will-formation respectively reflect retributive, 
restorative, procedural and co-operative modes of criminal justice. After first elaborating 
these links through the critical response of republican and procedural theories of 
democracy to the liberal practice of democratic will-formation and its retributive mode of 
justice, our discussion considers the recent practice of restorative and procedural justice 
with respect to Indigenous youth; and this in the context of a severely diminished role for 
Indigenous justice agencies in the public sphere. In light of certain shortcomings in both 
the restorative and procedural modes of justice, and so too with republican and procedural 
understandings of the democratic public sphere, we turn to a discussion of procedural 
communitarianism, anchored as it is in Dewey’s notion of social co-operation. From here 
we attempt a brief formulation of what a socially co-operative mode of justice might 
consist of; a mode of justice where historically racial and economically coercive injustices 
are sufficiently recognised. 
 
Social Recognition and Democratic Will-Formation 
Social recognition has long been a major aspect of traditional moral theory. Certainly 
Aristotle held that a good life was dependent on being viewed with social esteem, and 
Kant maintained respect for others as a necessary first principle in his practical reason. Yet 
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it was not until two further German Idealists, namely Fichte and Hegel, that such 
recognition was conceived in terms of a necessary and mutual reciprocity. Indeed Fichte 
was the first to argue that our individual autonomy essentially depends on our recognition 
of others as equally free, autonomous beings. The need for reciprocity in this process of 
recognition has become the legal ground, moreover, on which a rights-based claim to 
individual civil freedom is upheld (Honneth 2007: 132). Any violation of this mutual 
reciprocity, where one person’s right to civil freedom is in some way impinged upon or 
disrespected by another, thus becomes a ground for lawful punishment. In supporting this 
principle of reciprocal recognition and its retributive implications, Hegel argues that any 
failure of reciprocity stems directly from the rational will of the offender, such that s/he 
effectively consents to forfeit the right to freedom in equal degree or value to that which 
s/he has criminally removed from another (Hegel 1967: 70-1). As one commentator puts 
it, a criminal ‘may [thus] be punished without any violation of their right’ (Wood 1993: 
221). It is just such a position that classical liberal theory adheres to in its advocacy of 
retributive justice. 
 
Hegel’s distinction between the family, civil society and the state in his Philosophy of 
Right (1967) gives rise, however, to three forms of reciprocal recognition. There are, in 
effect, two further forms of recognition which emerge in the course of a subject’s self-
conscious relation to others. The one concerns the love between family members where 
their affective needs and desires are reciprocally recognised for the sake of emotional 
well-being. The other concerns a mutual esteem on the part of those who have made 
valuable political or social contributions to the state and its institutions. Now these three 
forms of recognition together constitute the very foundation of Hegel’s social ethics of 
freedom. A rupture in any of these modes of reciprocal recognition will result in moral 
injury. In the sphere of the family there may be a loss of self-confidence, in civil society a 
loss of self-respect, and in the sphere of the state a loss of self-esteem. Without any legally 
endorsed right to love or self-esteem, the will to restore such losses remains the 
responsibility of those individuals involved. Restoring the moral injury brought about by a 
breach in the legally endorsed right to self-respect or civil freedom, however, has wider 
ethical and indeed political implications. For here, the extent to which moral restoration 
may occur ultimately depends on the political style of democratic will-formation through 
which social justice is exercised. 
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The liberal model of democratic will-formation concerns isolated, autonomous individuals 
periodically coming together to elect political representatives who are entrusted with 
protecting their right to civil freedom; more specifically, the right to non-interference from 
other individuals and from the state itself, especially  if the latter seeks to go beyond a 
purely protective role. Social integration within the democratic public sphere is here 
limited to compliance with the laws of the state and occasional but regular moments of 
electoral choice. In view of this minimal approach to social integration, where the state 
ensures such integration largely through its law-enforcement agencies, any breach of an 
individual’s civil freedom needs to be met with the full force of judicial retribution. The 
shift to the welfare model of criminal justice did not derive, however, from any shift in the 
mode of democratic will-formation. Here there is simply a critical concession that criminal 
activity is not necessarily, as Hegel portrays it, the result of a rational will. An increasing 
capacity, largely exercised through positivist science, to diagnose emotional disturbance 
and psychological disability during the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is 
undoubtedly a significant factor driving this shift. Moreover, the essential rehabilitative 
goal of the welfare model is precisely to resuscitate and strengthen an individual’s 
capacity for engaging in self-reflective, rational processes, whereby s/he comes to 
recognise others as having a right to autonomy and non-interference. As such, 
rehabilitationist ideals held close to a liberal normative regime. 
 
Critical of liberal democratic theory, where ‘personal autonomy … is understood as being 
independent of processes of social integration’, recent republican and procedural theories 
of democratic will-formation argue that an individual is ‘capable of attaining personal 
autonomy only in association with all others’ (Honneth 2007: 221).1 Social recognition 
now concerns not simply an isolated self-conscious relation to others, but rather a 
communicative interaction with others in the public sphere. Honneth further indicates:  
…the participation of all citizens in political decision-making is not merely the 
means by which each individual can secure his or her own personal freedom; rather, 
what this participation articulates is the fact that it is only in interaction free from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  	  	   Honneth refers to Arendt and Habermas as representative of these respective republican and procedural theories. 
Notwithstanding certain differences which have emerged within republican theory itself between so-called civic 
humanists and civic republicans, on the basis of their respective allegiance to those notions of positive and negative 
liberty set out by Isaiah Berlin, for the purposes of this paper it is sufficient to note that both republican perspectives 
adhere to a model of restorative justice.	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domination that each individual’s freedom is to be attained and protected’ (Honneth 
2007: 221). 
In other words, human freedom is not a pre-social, natural condition protected by law, as 
liberal theory would have it, but a condition only made possible through an independent - 
empowered - capacity for communicative interaction in the public sphere. What 
nonetheless differentiates republican and procedural approaches to democratic will-
formation is the former’s claim that civic virtues are necessary to establish the solidarity 
required for political self-governance, while the latter argues that reaching rational and 
politically legitimate agreement is dependent on morally justified democratic procedures. 
As the direct legislative implementation of publically negotiated decisions, however, the 
republican state risks transforming the virtue of solidarity into the tyranny of majority rule. 
As the procedurally mediated outcome of various and multiple public domains of political 
debate, the procedural state is better placed to defend the interests of minority groups. The 
procedural state, however, not unlike its republican counter-part, suffers from a public 
sphere reduced to the politics of communicative interaction. Without also considering the 
divisions of social labour and race as specifically social domains of interaction, both 
republican and procedural forms of democratic will-formation remain tied to a 
communicatively abstract(purely political) understanding of community (Honneth 2007: 
235). Before further engaging with this line of thought, however, we need to understand 
the manner in which both republican and procedural forms of social democracy impact on 
the question of criminal justice. 
 
Republican and procedural modes of criminal justice 
The republican notion of ‘dominion’, where citizens have a right to freedom from any 
arbitrary domination, ‘requires the state … to subscribe to a principle of parsimony in the 
formulation of the punitive and other interventions associated with the criminal justice 
system’ (Braithwaite and Pettit 1990: 85). While reprobation remains necessary, 
reintegration, or the restoration of dominion and dignity, is also seen to be vital, not only 
for the offender, but also for the victim and the community at large. With respect to the 
offender, republicans speak of a process of ‘re-integrative shaming’ (Braithwaite 1999); a 
process which, over the last decade, has revealed a number of different restorative justice 
practices such as victim-offender mediation and dialogue, family group conferencing, 
circle sentencing or peacemaking circles, as well as community and victim specific 
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reparation where the offender gains skills and inclusive recognition for this expression of 
social responsibility (Cunneen and White 2007: 340). 
 
Like restorative justice, procedural justice seeks to strengthen ‘the influence of social 
values on people’s law-related behaviour’ (Tyler 2006: 316), or more particularly, on their 
self-regulating, ethical commitment to social and legal regulations. Unlike restorative 
justice, however, where this influence occurs through the active involvement of family and 
community members, with procedural justice, the influential lever is an adherence, on the 
part of those institutions dispensing criminal justice, to procedural rules of social fairness. 
For just as the democratic will is legitimately shaped through institutional and legal 
procedures of social fairness, so too it is argued, socially fair procedures apparent in 
criminal justice institutions will lead to a social recognition of the legitimacy and moral 
authority of those institutions. As Tyler (2006: 314) inversely indicates: 
… when the police engage in racial profiling, which people view as an 
unfair procedure, they [the police] diminish their moral authority by 
showing that they do not share the public’s moral values about how the 
police should act. 
Furthermore, a number of recent studies, conducted by Paternoster et al. (1997) and Tyler 
and Huo (2002), have shown that, 
By using fair processes, the police encourage the activation of the social 
values that sustain law-abiding behaviour over time. [Moreover,] fair 
procedures encourage immediate deference, lessen the likelihood of spirals 
of conflict, and increase the legitimacy of the police and courts (Tyler 2006: 
318). 
Unlike the re-integrative shaming of offenders peculiar to restorative justice, where 
relations with family and community members are accentuated, the model of procedural 
justice emphasises reciprocal relations of obligation and responsibility with the police and 
other institutions of criminal justice. Indeed these relations constitute the site of what 
Tyler (2006: 318) refers to as ‘civic education’. For, as he goes on to argue, when facing 
the law and its procedures, people also learn of its nature and authority. 
 
With an educative attempt to restore the values or virtues of social fairness and respect, the 
model of procedural justice has much in common with that of the restorative school. Yet 
their primary domain of application is different. For example, the procedural model has 
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greater bearing on an offender’s relations with police, courts and correctional institutions, 
while the restorative model has particular relevance to an offender’s relations with the 
victim, the wider community, and their family. Much of the ‘restorative justice’ literature 
appears to neglect this significant distinction. And despite early indications that these non-
retributive approaches to young offenders are resulting in slightly decreased rates of 
recidivism (Luke and Lind 2005), the persistent failure to recognise racial and economic 
differences as the pre-political basis of communicative exchange remains a significant 
stumbling block to a much fuller realisation of social justice for those belonging to 
disadvantaged communities. In what follows we attempt to elucidate this failure through 
the sharply decreasing presence of Indigenous justice groups, brought about by shifting 
and often intermittent government policies, and the current practices of restorative and 
procedural justice. 
 
Indigenous Justice Agreements and the NSW Young Offenders Act 
In view of an alarming over-representation of Indigenous youth in corrective service 
institutions, Australian attempts to address the social impacts of youth crime over the last 
decades have regularly focused on Indigenous youth crime. The report of the Royal 
Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (RCADIC) in 1991 recommended the 
establishment of an Aboriginal Justice Advisory Council (AJAC) in each state and 
territory to advise government on Indigenous justice issues and monitor government 
implementation of the Commission’s other numerous recommendations (Allison and 
Cunneen 2010: 648). Such councils were duly established, but by 1997 reports on the 
implementation of the Royal Commission’s recommendations were deemed unnecessary 
by the then federal government; and this despite ongoing high rates of Indigenous 
incarceration and deaths in custody. In light of this, the AJACs, together with the 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC), recommended the 
development of Indigenous Justice Agreements (IJA) through which improved justice 
outcomes for Indigenous people could be provided. 
 
All states and territories (except for the Northern Territory) agreed to develop, in 
partnership with Indigenous people, strategic agreements relating to the delivery, funding 
and coordination of Indigenous programs and services. These agreements would address 
social, economic, and cultural issues; justice issues; customary law; law reform; and 
government funding levels for programs. They would include targets for reducing the rate 
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of Indigenous over-representation in the criminal justice system, planning mechanisms, 
methods of service delivery, and monitoring and evaluation (Allison and Cunneen 2010: 
649). 
 
Such negotiated, bilateral agreements, where the principle of Indigenous self-
determination was paramount, came into effect in Queensland and Victoria in 2000, in 
New South Wales in 2003, and in Western Australia in 2004. Such agreements have led to 
broad government policy initiatives aimed at improving the lives of Indigenous people. 
Furthermore, some criminal justice agencies, notably the police, have now formulated 
strategic response plans focused on minimising possible contact between offending  youth 
and the criminal courts (Allison and Cunneen 2010: 650). 
 
Despite these apparently improved institutional and procedural conditions for addressing 
the issue of  indigenous over-representation in the criminal justice system, all the 
Aboriginal Justice Advisory Councils, with the exception of the Victorian AJAC, have 
now been ‘abolished or allowed to collapse by government’ (Allison and Cunneen 2010: 
648). ATSIC was also dissolved by the federal government in 2005. In view of the 
significant impact of these advisory bodies in the formulation of IJAs and subsequent 
government policy initiatives, as well as strategically improved agency responses to  youth 
offenders, their dismantling cannot but diminish ‘the likelihood of achieving those 
Indigenous justice outcomes emphasised in the RCADIC and subsequently by 
government’ (Allison and Cunneen 2010: 657). In referring to the New South Wales 
AJAC, Allison and Cunneen (2010: 661) further argue that a failure to build regional and 
local community-based structures, where Indigenous participation and leadership were 
fostered in an ongoing manner, eventually led to its abolition in 2009. The ongoing 
presence and influence of the Victorian AJAC, on the other hand, is due precisely, they 
argue, to its having established ‘well-coordinated state, regional and local community-
based justice structures … that guarantee ongoing Indigenous input into the [Indigenous 
Justice] Agreement’ (2010: 661). Under the principles of the IJA in Western Australia, an 
Aboriginal Justice Congress has been established, which similarly owes its ongoing 
presence to the development of regional and local advisory planning forums. 
 
While it remains unclear to what extent particular state IJAs or government policies 
explicitly support restorative and procedural justice approaches to Indigenous youth crime, 
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it is clear that some government legislation and some criminal justice agencies have 
implicitly adopted such approaches in their attempt to reduce rates of recidivism with 
respect to Indigenous and youth crime more generally. The New South Wales Young 
Offenders Act (1997), for example, came into effect following a pilot scheme of 
Community Youth Conferences; a scheme developed in large part around the successful 
Family Group Conferencing techniques already in use in New Zealand, where ‘family 
responsibility, children’s rights (including the right to due process), cultural 
acknowledgment and partnership between the state and the community’ (Hassall, cited in 
Bargen et al. 2005: 18) were key elements. In view of the NSW pilot scheme, the Young 
Offenders legislation determined that a community convener, independent of the police 
and the government, should be responsible for these conferences, that legal advice and 
information be made available to a young person in line with the 1989 UN Convention of 
the Rights of the Child (CROC), and provided criteria through which police would decide 
whether an offender should be cautioned, diverted to a Youth Justice Conference, or face a 
criminal court (Bargen et al. 2005: 20-22). Similar legislation had been enacted several 
years prior in Queensland, South Australia and Western Australia; however the NSW Act 
differs, particularly with respect to the three points just now mentioned. (Bargen et al. 
2005: 24). 
 
The NSW YOA applies to youth between 10 and 18 years of age, and for those between 
10 and 14 only if it can be shown they knew their actions to be unlawful. The three forms 
of intervention, i.e. warnings, cautions, and conference diversions, are possible only if the 
criminal act did not involve the death of another, a serious drug offence, a sexual offence, 
the breach of an apprehended violence order, or a traffic violation for those old enough to 
hold driving licenses (Garner et al. 2005: 47). Warnings are issued only for offences not 
involving violence, while cautions and conference diversions first require an admission of 
unlawful behaviour on the part of the young offender. The latter two forms of intervention 
also require the consent of the young person in question and can only be issued by 
specialist youth liaison officers trained by the police. For a person under 16 years of age 
the presence of a responsible adult, able to act in an advisory capacity, is also necessary. 
These major procedural requirements of the Act concerning interventional limits are 
further complimented by certain administrative procedures with regard to the selection of 
conference conveners from within local communities, as well as preparatory steps to the 
conduct of conferences. Only here, however, at the point of the conference itself does any 
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process of restorative justice properly begin. Bolitho (2005: 127) identifies a number of 
elements which, in her observation of around one hundred youth justice conferences, 
appear necessary for any restorative process to have some degree of success. These 
include offender support person(s), active engagement of offenders and victims (or their 
representatives) in open dialogue, material or genuinely felt verbal reparation to the 
victim(s), as well as a mutually agreed outcome which restores dignity to the offender. In 
the various case studies presented, two elements in particular appear to severely impede a 
restorative outcome, namely the absence of the victim from the conference, and some 
form of ongoing power relation between victim and offender. 
 
From still early studies concerning the relationship between youth justice conferencing 
and rates of recidivism, it would appear that a very small decrease in reoffending is 
evident (Luke and Lind 2005). The immediate impact of the NSW YOA has certainly 
resulted in a marked increase in warnings and cautions, with around 5 per cent of cases 
being referred to a conference (Chan and Luke 2005: 185). There was no significant 
difference, however, in the percentage of Indigenous and non-Indigenous youth being 
referred to a conference (2005: 179). These authors also found that despite there being 
almost half as many Indigenous first offenders facing court proceedings than before the 
Act, the rate of Indigenous youth being referred to court proceedings under the NSW YOA 
was almost double that of other youth (2005: 186). Moreover, the rate of imprisonment for 
all Indigenous people in NSW increased 48 per cent between 2001 and 2008, due not so 
much to increasing numbers of convictions but to lengthier prison sentences (Fitzgerald, 
cited in Allison and Cunneen 2010: 669, n.90). Hence despite an apparent turn towards 
restorative practices, at least with respect to youth crime, retributive justice clearly 
remains a high priority for government. In a pointed critique of law and order politics, 
Boersig (2005: 125) argues: 
Consequently, the state, caught in a shallow debate, fails to address the 
fundamental socially based flaws that arise from marginalisation and 
exclusion from power, and the ‘problem’ of Indigenous youth offending 
remains perennial. 
If restorative justice in the indigenous context does not address the historical question of 
racial power relations, he continues, then it can hardly said to be restorative. 
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In short, if restorative justice does provide a pathway to justice then it must be an initiative 
embraced and controlled by Indigenous people. The subtext of this analysis, then, is one 
that also embraces notions of Indigenous sovereignty and self-determination as the 
foundation and core for any initiative (Boersig 2005: 127). 
 
Now while the IJAs, negotiated in four states by their respective AJACs, were indeed 
premised on Indigenous self-determination, the dismantling of these advisory councils, 
except in Victoria, has clearly left a political vacuum with respect to any real practice of 
self-determination, not to mention a capacity to represent the views of Indigenous people. 
And while the NSW YOA stipulates that any youth justice conference convener needs to 
be drawn from the local community, it remains unclear to what extent such conveners, in 
the context of conferences involving Indigenous victims and offenders, are themselves 
Indigenous. 
 
Further criticisms have also been directed at the theory and practice of restorative justice. 
Cunneen and White (2007: 349) argue, for example, that when the practice of restorative 
justice is tied solely to ‘trivial offenses … at the soft end of the juvenile justice spectrum 
… [it acts] as a [legitimising] filter that reinforces the logic and necessity of the hard end 
of the system, [namely] the real justice of retribution and punishment’. Moreover, if 
restorative justice remains tied merely to restoring the harm done to particular individuals 
and their families, no attention is given to the need for ‘transforming communities and 
building progressive social alliances that might change the conditions under which 
offending takes place’ (Cunneen and White 2007: 350). This emphasis on social and 
community justice, developed as a critique of the limitations of current restorative 
practices, is also evident in Lofton’s (2004) more economically directed appeal against 
systemic injustices. Firstly, she argues, restorative justice theory takes no account of wide-
scale socio-economic deprivation or poverty and the extent to which young individuals are 
driven to theft through seemingly unchangeable or deeply embedded social disparities. As 
ongoing victims of social deprivation, young offenders are for the most part attempting to 
rectify this injustice, however momentarily. Secondly, with an all too narrow focus, 
restorative justice understands crime simply as relations between individuals and small 
groups. Restorative justice thereby fails to address crimes perpetrated on countless 
individuals through the often fraudulent yet systemically justified pursuit of economic 
profit and power by large corporations and other unscrupulous operators. Thirdly, 
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restorative justice seeks only to heal a particular, isolated harm without attempting to heal 
those harms through which an offender is likely to be at once a victim of social and family 
circumstance. The labels of ‘victim’ and ‘offender’, she maintains, thus appear far too 
simplistic. Fourthly, as currently practiced, restorative justice remains at best a medium-
term, band-aid solution to a problem that would be better addressed from a long-term, 
whole-of-society perspective. 
 
Similar criticisms may be directed at procedural justice practices, which, while 
emphasising the principle of social fairness or equality before the law, nonetheless fail to 
address long-standing racial and socio-economic injustices; injustices which, for the most 
part, are unconsciously reflected in the criminal acts of young offenders. In light of these 
criticisms of procedural and restorative justice practices, and Honneth’s earlier mentioned 
criticism concerning the one-sided political nature of both republican and procedural 
notions of community, the question arises whether there is some other mode of criminal 
justice and democratic will-formation which may sufficiently dissolve these critical issues.  
 
Procedural Communitarianism and Cooperative Justice 
Just such an alternative, Honneth argues, is evident in Dewey’s understanding of the 
democratic public sphere as at once social and political. For a normative democratic 
community does not consist merely in a politics of communicative exchange, whether 
dependent on civic virtues or procedural fairness, but also in what Dewey refers to as 
social co-operation through a just division of social labour. Not dissimilarly to the 
communitarianism evident in Marx’s early writings, the early Dewey presents the 
normative ethic of social democracy as the ‘free association of all citizens for the purpose 
of realising the ends they share on the basis of a [just] division of labor’ (Honneth 2007: 
225). In other words, while any political dimension to the democratic public sphere still 
remains absent, Dewey’s emphasis on social co-operation indicates the resolution of social 
and economic injustices as a necessary aspect of social democracy. In his later work, in 
particular The Public and its Problems (1927), this co-operative social realm is mediated, 
however, by a politically institutionalised public sphere. For measures regulating the 
impact of particular group interactions are also necessary, he argues, to protect the 
freedom and interests of others in the social community; and such legally endorsed 
measures can only be determined through the institutionalised politics of communicative 
exchange. Here the procedural aspect of Dewey’s communitarianism is clearly evident. 
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Yet while Dewey defends rationally justified procedures as the political medium of 
democratic will-formation, his is not a socially vacuous proceduralism where legally 
guaranteed rights are deemed a sufficient response to social and economic injustices.  
Indeed a democratic public sphere depends first and foremost on the inclusion of all 
members of society in the social reproduction process; for only through their sense of 
making a co-operative contribution to communal well-being will individuals form some 
interest in participating in the political domain (Honneth 2007: 235). Hence the social 
recognition of others occurs not solely through a procedural recognition of rights or a 
republican esteem for political virtues, but rather more significantly through a co-operative 
capacity for overcoming socio-economic injustices. In contrast to the singularly political 
notion of esteem adhered to by republican theory, Dewey’s communitarianism 
acknowledges a multiplicity of social abilities and values worthy of esteem. Moreover, as 
Honneth argues, ‘within networks of groups and associations that relate to one another on 
the basis of a division of labor, the factual pluralism of value orientations has a functional 
advantage [over republicanism] because it ensures the development of an abundance of 
completely different interests and abilities’ (2007: 233). 
 
How then might Dewey’s procedural communitarianism translate as a mode of co-
operative justice? Criminal activity would here be associated with hindering the capacity 
of others to co-operatively partake in processes of social reproduction and renewal. With 
respect to social groups within the division of labour, the abolition of ATSIC and the 
Aboriginal Justice Advisory Councils (AJACs), discussed earlier, is implicated in the 
generation of rime. Similarly, government failure to build the capacity of Aboriginal 
communities for becoming significant partners in a wider social co-operative might also 
be considered generative of crime. . Without increased community capacity and sense of 
social well-being, achieved through the redistribution of wealth from the already wealthy, 
it is hardly surprising that some Indigenous youth all too frequently and repeatedly find 
themselves confronting the criminal justice system. Despite the restorative mode of justice 
showing some slight improvement in rates of Indigenous recidivism, a co-operative mode 
of justice would seek to minimise the effects of an overwhelming, already culturally 
inscribed, sense of shame which can exist among sections of the Indigenous population; a 
shame which springs not so much necessarily from the offense committed but from the 
prospect of being cut off from community. While nonetheless pursuing family and 
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community conferencing as a court diversionary strategy, such conferencing would 
emphasise the need to develop socially co-operative relations between victim and offender 
through an agreed process of tasks or services. Such co-operation would also entail 
appropriate community groups or mentors forming ongoing valued relations with the 
offender through the development of a sustaining self-narrative. The availability of 
conference facilitators drawn directly from the Indigenous community would also need to 
be assured. In effect, the question of building social capacity becomes the co-operative 
responsibility of government and local Indigenous and non-Indigenous community groups. 
Until the presence of Indigenous agencies becomes is institutionalised, however, and until 
social co-operation becomes a foundation for democratic relations, it seems unlikely that 
rates of Indigenous youth crime will substantially decline. 
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